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Overview
1. EMMA Concept
2. Feedback from V&V activity to Requirements
3. ICAO Regulatory documents 
– Related Documents
– EMMA impact and possible updates
– Eurocontrol A-SMGCS project 
– Recommendations to EC
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EMMA2 
Service 
Steps
Description
Step 1 
Step 2
Step 3 • Step2 + 
• Detection and identification of 
all vehicles 
• Detection of Obstacles
on the Manoeuvring area
on the Apron area
Movement area
Comments
EMMA / 
EUROCONTROL
Level 1
• Detection and accurate position 
of all aircraft, all vehicles, and 
obstacles*
• Identification of all cooperative 
aircraft and vehicles
• Detection and identification of all 
aircraft
EMMA Concept - Surveillance
*obstacles are not part of EUROCONTROL Concept
Pr
a
g
u
e
,
 
2
0
0
6
-
0
3
-
2
2
© EMMA, <Prague Workshop> 4
EMMA2 
Service 
Steps
Description Comments
Step 1 • Runway Conflict/Incursion detection 
and alerting
• Restricted area infringement detect.
Step 2 •Taxiway Conflict/Incursion detection 
and alerting
Step 3 •Detection of plan / route deviation
•Support to Communication (CPDLC)
•ATCO coordination (EFS)
Step 4 •Conflict/Incursion detection and alerting 
of apron / stand / gate conflicts
Implementation of 
conflict resolution
advisory
may be initiated at
any step
EMMA Concept - Control
EMMA / EUROCONTROL Level 2
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EMMA Concept – Guidance*
(Flight Crew+ Vehicle Drivers)
EMMA2 
Service 
Steps
Description Comments
Step 1 • Airport Moving Map 
incl. Surface Movement Alerting
•Surveillance and Monitoring 
Service for onboard users
Step 2 •Ground-Air Database Upload
•Ground Traffic Display
•Traffic Conflict Detection
•CPDLC Ground Clearance and Taxi 
Route Uplink
•Braking and Steering Cue (landing 
roll and taxi)
•Ground TIS-B + DL needed
Step 3 •HUD Surface Guidance •HUD is already available for 
approach
Step 4 •Automated Steering •Major changes in equipments and 
procedures  
*Guidance is the wrong term here, pilots and veh. driv. receive different kinds of services 
6Op_Perf-05 For the surveillance service, the allowable error in reported position shall be 
consistent with the requirements set by the control task of the controller: 12m.
ICAO 4.2.3 The actual position of an aircraft, vehicles and obstacle on the surface should be 
determined within a radius of 7,5m.
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_26
The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDF to clients 
should be 7,5m or better at a confidence level of 95%.
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 1
7Op_Perf-05 For the surveillance service, the allowable error in reported position shall be 
consistent with the requirements set by the control task of the controller: 12m.
ICAO 4.2.3 The actual position of an aircraft, vehicles and obstacle on the surface should be 
determined within a radius of 7,5m.
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_26
The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDF to clients 
should be 7.5m or better at a confidence level of 95%.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-5 Reported Position Accuracy (RPA) [of antenna position] RPA = 3,2m – 7,5m*
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements 
Example 1
8Op_Perf-05 For the surveillance service, the allowable error in reported position shall be 
consistent with the requirements set by the control task of the controller: 12m.
ICAO 4.2.3 The actual position of an aircraft, vehicles and obstacle on the surface should be 
determined within a radius of 7,5m.
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_26
The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDF to clients 
should be 7.5m or better at a confidence level of 95%.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-5 Reported Position Accuracy (RPA) RPA = 3,2m – 7,5m*
Operational Feasibility (Validation)
VA-1 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft in the 
runway sensitive area is accurate enough to exercise control in a safe and efficient 
way.
M = 5,1*
VA-2 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of vehicles in the 
runway sensitive area …
M = 4,7*
VA-3 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft on the 
taxi ways is accurate enough …
M = 5,4*
VA-… … …
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements 
Example 1
9Op_Perf-05 For the surveillance service, the allowable error in reported position shall be 
consistent with the requirements set by the control task of the controller: 12m.
ICAO 4.2.3 The actual position of an aircraft, vehicles and obstacle on the surface should be 
determined within a radius of 7,5m.
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_26
The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDF to clients 
should be 7.5m or better at a confidence level of 95%.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-5 Reported Position Accuracy (RPA) RPA = 3,2m – 7,5m*
Operational Feasibility (Validation)
VA-1 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft in the 
runway sensitive area is accurate enough to exercise control in a safe and efficient 
way.
M = 5,1*
VA-2 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of vehicles in the 
runway sensitive area …
M = 4,7*
VA-3 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft on the 
taxi ways is accurate enough …
M = 5,4*
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 1
Comments:
• Today, a static RPA of 7.5m can easily met technically (3 test sites proved it)
• Controllers accept this performance to meet their operational needs
• However, 12m or even 20m could be sufficient for some operational needs (e.g. only surveillance)
Recommendations:
• Keep the ICAO requirements of 7.5m (ICAO 4.3.3 = validated)
• But allow lower accuracy, if the user accept it to meet their operational needs
10
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 2
Op_Perf-01 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or obstacle is detected and reported at 
the output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99,9% at minimum.
ICAO No performance requirement, but recommend to prove it
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_35
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the 
output of the SDF should be 99,9% at minimum.
11
Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 2
Op_Perf-01 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or obstacle is detected and reported at 
the output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99,9% at minimum.
ICAO No performance requirement, but recommend to prove it
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_35
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the 
output of the SDF should be 99,9% at minimum.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-2 Probability of Detection (PD) PD (short) = 99,65 – 99,9%
PD (long) = up to 99,9%
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Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 2
Op_Perf-01 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or obstacle is detected and reported at 
the output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99,9% at minimum.
ICAO No performance requirement, but recommend to prove it
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_35
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the 
output of the SDF should be 99,9% at minimum.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-2 Probability of Detection (PD) PD (short) = 99,65 – 99,9%
PD (long) = up to 99,9%
Operational Feasibility (Validation)
VA-55 When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be 
used to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.
M = 5,3*
VA-36 I can rely on A-SMGCS when giving taxi clearances even when visual reference is not 
possible.
M = 4,9*
VA-48 When an intersection is not visible line up from this intersection could be applied in a 
safe way when using A-SMGCS.
M = 5,1*
VA-… … ….
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Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 2
Op_Perf-01 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or obstacle is detected and reported at 
the output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99,9% at minimum.
ICAO No performance requirement, but recommend to prove it
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_35
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the 
output of the SDF should be 99,9% at minimum.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-2 Probability of Detection (PD) PD (short) = 99,65 – 99,9%
PD (long) = up to 99,9%
Operational Feasibility (Validation)
VA-55 When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be 
used to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.
M = 5,3*
VA-36 I can rely on A-SMGCS when giving taxi clearances even when visual reference is not 
possible.
M = 4,9*
VA-48 When an intersection is not visible line up from this intersection could be applied in a 
safe way when using A-SMGCS.
M = 5,1*
Comments:
• 99,9% of detection could not be met easily
• But, controller accepted the lower PD performance to meet their operational needs
• PD Parameter is very weak (operational performance behind is not visible)
Recommendation: 
• Better: Matrix of Detection (shows number and durations of gaps) [EMMA VE-16]
14
Matrix of Detection
Gaps 1 sec 2 sec 3 sec 4 sec 5 sec >5 sec Total
0
1
2
3
4
5
>5
Total
e.g.
0,001%
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Feedback to EMMA operational Requirements
Example 2
Op_Perf-01 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or obstacle is detected and reported at 
the output of the surveillance element of the A-SMGCS shall be 99,9% at minimum.
ICAO No performance requirement, but recommend to prove it
TRD EMMA 
Tech_Surv_35
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the 
output of the SDF should be 99,9% at minimum.
Technical Tests (Verification) PRG / MXP / TLS
VE-2 Probability of Detection (PD) PD (short) = 99,65 – 99,9%
PD (long) = up to 99,9%
Operational Feasibility (Validation)
VA-55 When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be 
used to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.
M = 5,3*
VA-36 I can rely on A-SMGCS when giving taxi clearances even when visual reference is not 
possible.
M = 4,9*
VA-48 When an intersection is not visible line up from this intersection could be applied in a 
safe way when using A-SMGCS.
M = 5,1*
Recommendation: 
• Better: Matrix of Detection (shows number and durations of gaps)
• OP_Perf-01 shall be replaced by a comprehensive set of PD requirement, w.r.t. 
•Number and durations of gaps
•Aerodrome area (RWY, TWY, Apron)
•Objects (aircraft, vehicle, unknown)
•Weather conditions (snow, precipitation)
•Short vs. long-term measurements
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ICAO Regulatory Documents
EMMA 1 Concepts and Operational Requirements potentially impact the 
following ICAO documents:
• Annexes 2,10,11 and 14
• ICAO PANS ATM (Doc 4444) and ICAO Regional 
Supplementary Procedures Doc7030/4-EUR
• Doc 9426 (ATS planning manual)
• Doc 7754 (Air Nav.Plan,Europe,Vol1)
• Doc 9432 (Manual of radiotelephony)
• Doc 9476 (SMGCS manual)
• Doc 9365 (Manual of all weather operations)
• Doc 9830 A-SMGCS Manual
• Doc 8168 PANS-OPS (Flight procedures : Transponder 
Operating Procedures)
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ICAO DOC 4444 – PANS ATM
PANS ATM DOC4444:
– CHAPTER 7.   PROCEDURES FOR AERODROME CONTROL 
SERVICE
– CHAPTER 8.   RADAR SERVICES
– CHAPTER 12. PHRASEOLOGIES
– CHAPTER 15. PROCEDURES RELATED TO EMERGENCIES, 
COMMUNICATION FAILURE AND CONTINGENCIES
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ICAO DOC 4444 – PANS ATM
CHAPTER 7.   PROCEDURES FOR AERODROME CONTROL SERVICE
7.1 FUNCTIONS OF AERODROME CONTROL TOWERS
7.1.1 General
• A-SMGCS may replace visual observation
7.10 PROCEDURES FOR LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS
New definitions
• Visibility conditions: as defined in the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual 
(Vis1, Vis2, Vis3, Vis4)
New procedures
• To define the use of A-SMGCS in Vis2,
• Update of Low visibility procedures taking  into account A-SMGCS
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CHAPTER 8.   RADAR SERVICES
8.2 PRESENTATION OF RADAR INFORMATION
Information available from A-SMGCS data fusion are used for display to the controller
8.5 USE OF SSR TRANSPONDERS
8.5.3 Operation of SSR transponders
8.x USE OF MODE S TRANSPONDERS
8.x.x Operation of Mode S transponders
8.6 GENERAL RADAR PROCEDURES
8.6.2 Identification of aircraft
Use of A-SMGCS Identification procedure
8.6.3 Transfer of radar identification
identification is no more a radar identification but A-SMGCS Identification
8.10 USE OF RADAR IN THE AERODROME CONTROL SERVICE
8.10.2 Use of surface movement radar (SMR)
8.1.x Use of Advanced Surface Movement, Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS)
- 8.1.x.1 Use of A-SMGCS Surveillance
- 8.1.x.2 Use of A-SMGCS Alerts
ICAO DOC 4444 – PANS ATM
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CHAPTER 12. PHRASEOLOGIES
To take into account incorrect Mode-S Transponder setting preventing 
identification procedure
ICAO DOC 4444 – PANS ATM
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CHAPTER 15. PROCEDURES RELATED TO EMERGENCIES,
COMMUNICATION FAILURE AND CONTINGENCIES
15.5 ATC CONTINGENCIES
15.6 OTHER ATC CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES
15.6.2 Short term conflict alert
15.6.3 Procedures in regard to aircraft equipped with airborne  
collision avoidance systems (ACAS)
15.6.4 Minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) procedures
15.6.5 Change of radiotelephony call sign for aircraft
………………………….
New procedures
• Procedures with regard to A-SMGCS Alerts
ICAO DOC 4444 – PANS ATM
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Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS) Manual
Appendix A: A-SMGCS Categorisation
• categorisation is of less practical use 
EMMA Concept facilitates this categorisation
ICAO DOC 9830 A-SMGCS Manual
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Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS) Manual
Appendix B: A-SMGCS Implementation Level
• “one means of grouping A-SMGCS implementation” (“an example”)
EMMA Services and associated Implementation Packages
• More guidance for users to define what they need to implement
ICAO DOC 9830 A-SMGCS Manual
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Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS) Manual
Chapter 4: Performance Requirements
•See examples before
•Work is still in progress 
ICAO DOC 9830 A-SMGCS Manual
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Aircraft Operations. Volume I — Flight Procedures
This volume describes operational procedures recommended for 
the guidance of flight operations personnel. 
• Mode S Transponder Operating Procedures on the GROUND
ICAO DOC 8168 – PANS OPS
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EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Project (1)
Update of ICAO Manuals
Doc 4444 – Main document to update
• Manual used by regulators as a reference
– Either directly or to derive national regulations for procedures to 
be used for Air Navigation Services
• Any update is carefully considered and is a long process
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EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Project (2)
Update of ICAO Manuals
Doc 7030/4-Europe part – As a first possible step
Three amendments are prepared
• Definition of “Reduced Aerodrome Visibility conditions”
• Definition of A-SMGCS, surveillance function, 
identification procedures and Alerts function
• Introduction of Mode S transponder procedures on the 
ground
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Recommendations to EC
With respect to changes to ICAO 
– EC and EUROCONTROL should formalise a joint European approach to
ICAO for adoption
With respect to SESAR
– EMMA Concepts and Requirements should feed in SESAR Definition 
Phase
Pr
a
g
u
e
,
 
2
0
0
6
-
0
3
-
2
2
© EMMA, <Prague Workshop> 29
EMMA Concept and Requirements
Impact on ICAO 
Questions ?
